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ABSTRACT
Recently emerging Decentralized Finance (DeFi) takes the
promise of cryptocurrencies a step further, leveraging their
decentralized networks to transform traditional financial
products into trustless and transparent protocols that run
without intermediaries. However, these protocols often re-
quire critical external information, like currency or commod-
ity exchange rates, and in this respect they rely on special
oracle nodes. In this paper, we present the first study of DeFi
oracles deployed in practice. First, we investigate designs
of mainstream DeFi platforms that rely on data from ora-
cles. We find that these designs, surprisingly, position oracles
as trusted parties with no or low accountability. Then, we
present results of large-scale measurements of deployed or-
acles. We find and report that prices reported by oracles
regularly deviate from current exchange rates, oracles are
not free from operational issues, and their reports include
anomalies. Finally, we compare the oracle designs and pro-
pose potential improvements.
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1 INTRODUCTION
One promise of open cryptocurrencies is to make money and
payments universally accessible without needing trusted
parties. Decentralized Finance (DeFi) aims at extending this
promise, proposing novel and traditional financial tools built
on the top of a blockchain-based smart contract platform.
DeFi offersmultiple advantages over traditional finance. First,
it inherits the blockchain properties, like decentralization,
openness, accessibility, and censorship-resistance. Second,
DeFi is highly flexible, allowing for rapid innovation and
experiments by combining, stacking, or connecting different
financial instruments. Finally, DeFi provides interoperable
services. Generally, new DeFi projects can be built or com-
posed by combining other DeFi platforms.
An increasing trend within the DeFi ecosystem is hybrid
protocols which try to offer all advantages of DeFi, but elim-
inating the high volatility of cryptoassets [24], which hin-
ders broader DeFi adoption. They do so by connecting their
cryptoassets to conventional financial instruments. A promi-
nent example is decentralized lending protocols that have
achieved more recent attention than any other categories of
DeFi. MakerDAO [11], a collateral-backed stablecoin whose
value is stable relative to USD, enables anyone to leverage
their collateral assets to generate new tokens [12] through
a dynamic system of collateralized debts. Once new assets
are generated, they can be used in the same manner as any
other cryptocurrency. After paying down the debt and sta-
bility fee, the users can withdraw collateral and close their
loans. Following the MakerDAO success, other DeFi lending
platforms, like Compound [7], were launched. By offloading
the traditional credit checking and reducing the costs with
automation, Compound markets are actually a pool of assets
that algorithmically derive interest-rates based on the supply
and demand for the particular asset. Lenders and borrowers
of these assets interact with the protocol directly in order
to earn and pay respectively a floating interest rate, without
having to negotiate any kind of terms such as maturity or
interest rate. As of March 2020, DeFi Pulse reports that active
outstanding loans from four open lending protocols – Ful-
crum [23], dYdX [8], MakerDAO and Compound are above
$200 million [16].
Another example of a project that aims at value stability is
AmpleForth [1], the first DeFi protocol with supply elasticity.
In response to the changes in demand, the platform always
seeks a price-supply equilibrium based on the states of mar-
ket and CPI index by universally expanding to, or contracting
from holders, aiming at making it robust to economic shocks
and runaway deflations. Synthetix [14], another recent DeFi
project, allows the creation of “synthetic assets” – Synths
whose prices can track currencies, cryptocurrencies, and
commodities. The holders firstly lock their Synthetix native
SNX tokens as collateral to mint the Synths which are tokens
intended to track the value of the target asset (e.g., USD or
gold).
All these systems require real-time information about the
market price of the assets used as collateral and redemption.
It is necessary for their security as the value (expressed in
fiat) of cryptoasset collaterals is volatile. To implement this
functionality, DeFi protocols introduce oracles, third par-
ties reporting the price of assets from real-world (off-chain)
sources. An oracle acts as a source of data that is being fed
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to a smart contract. Although oracles play a critical role in
the DeFi ecosystem, the underlying mechanics of oracles are
vague and unexplored. Firstly, their deployment practices,
including how frequent the price updates, how to aggregate
the price value from multiple nodes, etc., are not transpar-
ent nor accountable, leaving room for various misbehaving.
Secondly, the level of trust placed in oracles is unclear and
most likely unknown to many participants of the ecosystem.
Finally, the impact of a potentially malicious oracle (or a
group of oracles) on the DeFi ecosystem is not investigated.
In this work, we shed light on these issues, presenting
the first (up to our best knowledge) study on DeFi oracles.
First, we explain oracle designs deployed in practice. Second,
we systemically investigate the deployment of oracles for
four popular open DeFi platforms - MakerDAO, Compound,
AmpleForth and Synthetix- which rely on external oracles
for price feeds. We conduct detailed measurements on the
price deviation that comes from the differences between
the information provided by external oracles and real-world
prices. Moreover, wemeasure the robustness and deployment
practices of oracles by transaction graph analysis. Finally,
we compare the deployed platforms, and we give insights on
potential improvements.
2 BACKGROUND
Many DeFi protocols aim at providing low volatility of their
cryptoassets by using crypto collateral with its price pegged
to some real-world assets.1 Unlike in the real world, in DeFi
protocols communicating exchange prices is not trivial, since
these protocols are implemented as smart contracts deployed
on the blockchain, without having access to any external re-
sources (like current asset prices). Therefore, in such a design,
price oracle is a fundamental component bridging cryptoas-
sets with the external information about their intended value.
In this section, we give a background on prominent DeFi
protocols and their oracle designs. All of these platforms, as
well as the vast majority of all DeFi platforms, are built upon
Ethereum [20].
2.1 MakerDAO
MakerDAO is the most popular decentralized lending proto-
col where each its native token SAI is pegged to USD and is
backed by collateral in the form of cryptoassets. Since deal-
ing with cryptocurrency volatility is a problem, MakerDAO
offers the programmability of crypto without the downside
of volatility that you see with traditional cryptocurrencies
like Bitcoin or Ethereum. By leveraging their cryptoassets
1We note, that there are other designs that do not require pegs or collaterals
but these systems are out of scope this submission and we refer the reader
to recent surveys [26, 32].
into a Collateralized Debt Positions (CDP) contract as collat-
eral, users are able to generate multi-collateral SAI tokens
that can be traded in the same manner as any other cryp-
tocurrencies. In return, the CDP accrues the debt known as
overcollateralized loans determined by collateralization ratio
(i.e., C-Ratio), locking them out of access until the outstand-
ing debt is paid. The C-Ratio currently is set to 150% that
helps the platform manage the risk of the borrowers by over-
collateralizing the underlying assets. When the users want
to retrieve their collateral, they have to pay down the debt in
the CDP, plus the stability fee that continuously accrues on
the debt over time, which can only be paid in MakerDAO’s
native tokens (MKR). In addition to payment of the stability
fee, the MKR token also makes it possible to vote on the
evolution of the platform and plays an important role in the
governance of MakerDAO, in proportion to the number of
MKR each owner has. The combination of SAI as a stablecoin
and MKR as a governance token ensures the equilibrium of
the system. Holders of MKR benefit directly from the use of
SAI and the usage of the SAI is managed by the holders who
are able to protect the system.
MakerDAO introduces an oracle module to obtain the
real-time price of assets. The accuracy of this information is
critical as it determines whether a CDP has enough collat-
eral assets locked up and when to trigger liquidations. The
oracle module is composed of a number of whitelisted oracle
addresses and an aggregator contract. Oracles send periodic
price updates to the aggregator which aggregates them, com-
putes the median price as the reference price, and updates
the platform by this reference price. Each asset type has an
independent aggregator contract to collect information from
authorized oracles. We give a high-level overview of this ar-
chitecture in Figure 1. The aggregator contract implements
access control logic allowing addition and removal of price
oracle addresses. This operation is determined by the gover-
nors – MKR holders, who vote and update the changes on
oracle addresses. Moreover, the logic allows governors to
set other parameters that control the aggregator’s behaviors,
e.g., the minimum number of oracles necessary to accept a
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Figure 1: Oracle hierarchy of MakerDAO platform.
new median value. Consequently, in such a decentralized
governance mechanism, the oracles could be manipulable by
MKR holders. Similar in style to 51% attacks, a coalition can
profitably manipulate governance to “steal” system collat-
eral [9].
2.2 Compound
Compound is a blockchain-based borrowing and lending
platform where participants can lend their cryptoassets out
and earn interest on it. Participants deposit their cryptoassets
to the Compound smart contract as collateral, and borrow
against it. This contract automatically matches borrowers
and lenders, and adjusts interest rates dynamically based
on supply and demand. Similar to MakerDAO, Compound
employs oracles for price feed which are managed and con-
trolled by administrators – holders of Compound’s native
COMP token. Compound platform is governed and upgraded
by COMP holders who propose, vote and implement any
changes through the administrative functionalities. Propos-
als can include changes like adjusting an interest rate model
or collateral factor, managing the aggregator contract, and
choosing the source of the oracle.
The logic of price updates in Compound is depicted in
Figure 2 and as shown, at the beginning, the administrator
deploys an anchor contract and then creates an aggregator
contract withmin, anchor and tolerance set, wheremin is
the minimum number of reports necessary to calculate a new
median value which is set to one by default, anchor indicates
the address of anchor contract and tolerance rate is set to
10%. The oracle system in Compound allows multiple au-
thorized sources, known as reporters, to report price data to
start
The number of N oracle(s) push reports
bound >= tolerance
Yes
price := median
Aggregator set min, anchor and tolerance
N=0
calculate median of reports, 
Panchor := price of anchor
calculate bound := |median - Panchor| / Panchor 
end
No
price not updated 
No
Yes
Figure 2: Oracle logics in Compound.
the aggregator contract. Reporters can be exchanges, other
DeFi projects, applications, over-the-counter (OTC) trading
desks, etc. The aggregator receives the reference prices from
reporters, verifies them and calculates the median value from
them, and then stores it in order to be accessed by the Com-
pound market. The mechanism of updating the reference
price of the asset is based on an anchor price (reported by an
anchor address), together with upper and lower bounds that
the median prices calculated by the aggregator are checked
against. Should the ratio between a new median price and
the anchor price be out-of-bounds, the official reference price
of the asset would not be updated.
2.3 AmpleForth
Traditional commodities like gold or even cryptocurrencies
like Bitcoin (produced based on a fixed supply schedule)
cannot efficiently respond to changes in demand, making
them vulnerable to destabilizing economic shocks and run-
away deflation. To address this shortcoming, AmpleForth
creates AMPL tokens to automatically propagate asset price-
information into supply. By universally and proportionally
expanding or contracting the quantity of tokens from each
holder based on the price exchange rate between the AMPL
and USD, this automatic price-supply equilibrium is counter-
cyclical and non-dilutive. AMPL is initially pegged to USD,
however not into perpetuity, since the platform takes the
Consumer Price Index into account to balance future USD
inflation. Thus, AmpleForth aims for purchasing power sta-
bility by altering the supply based on the demand for AMPL
tokens. More specifically, whenever there is more demand
than supply, the platform automatically increases the total
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start
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report[0,1…,N]
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n < N-1
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end
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Figure 3: Oracle logics in AmpleForth.
quantity of AMPL to prevent the relative price of goods from
rising. Similarly, when the total demand is less than supply,
it decreases the quantity accordingly.
It is critical for such protocol aiming at a price-supply
equilibrium to have a reliable and accurate source of market
price information. This core functionality of AmpleForth
is depicted in Figure 3. The platform administrator sets the
min, delay, and expire parameters of the aggregator contract
during its initialization, wheremin (one by default), indicat-
ing the minimum number of providers with valid reports to
consider the aggregated report valid, delay is the number of
seconds since reporting that has to pass before a report is
usable (set to one hour, by default), and expire represents the
number of seconds after which the report is deemed expired.
In AmpleForth, this value is 12 hours by default. A valid
report must exist on-chain publicly for at least 1 hour before
it can be used by the supply policy and will expire on-chain
if a new report is not provided before 12 hours elapses. That
. . . Too Old Valid Timestamp Too Recent. . .
T0 − expire T0 − delay T0
expire
delay
Figure 4: The valid range of a report in AmpleForth.
means that only the reports submitted within the valid times-
tamp are considered as valid reports. We depict this logic
in Figure 4 and let us assume that the aggregator retrieves
price information at T0. The correct AMPL/USD price rate is
median calculated by aggregator based on the reports that
were submitted in
T0 − expire ≤ valid timestamp ≤ T0 − delay
from authorized oracles.
Chainlink. Smart contract platforms, like Ethereum, lack
the ability of connecting smart contracts with off-chain re-
sources (like web) natively. Chainlink [4] aims to resolve this
issue by acting as a decentralized oracle network bridging
on-chain smart contract with the off-chain environment. (In
Section 5, we discuss competing designs to Chainlink.) It
implements this by giving smart contracts APIs allowing to
request off-chain resources such as market data, bank pay-
ments, retail payments, back-end systems, events data, or
web content. Chainlink consists of a network of multiple
decentralized, and independent oracles and aggregators that
collect and process off-chain data and deliver it (processed)
to smart contracts on request. AmpleForth is an example of
a platform that is integrated with Chainlink [4].
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Figure 5: Oracle hierarchy of Synthetix platform.
2.4 Synthetix
Synthetix [15] is a platform that allows users creating and
exchanging synthetic versions of assets such as gold, silver,
cryptocurrencies, and traditional currencies. The purpose of
Synthetix is to allow the creation of “synthetic assets” whose
prices can track currencies, cryptocurrencies and commodi-
ties. Synthetix involves two distinct types of token. Users
first purchase and lock up Synthetix’s native token SNX into
the Synthetix contract that gets staked as collateral to back
other Synths tokens. 2 These Synths are synthetic assets cre-
ated through Synthetix platform. Please note that Synthetix
platforms always values sUSD, one of synthetic assets, at
one USD. The price of Synths is determined through oracles
that report external real-world price of asset to the aggre-
gator contract which then proceeds the median calculation.
As shown in Figure 5, the current oracles and aggregators
are provided through Chainlink. Each asset type provides
an independent Chainlink’s aggregator which maintains a
number of oracle sources. To ensure accurate data feeds, the
oracles update the on-chain price in a short period, like 5 or
10 minutes.
3 MEASUREMENTS
In this section, we present details and results or our mea-
surement studies. We focus on the AmpleForth, Synthetix,
MakerDAO, and Compound platforms, and we measure and
report on the following: a) market price volatility of the plat-
forms’ assets (Section 3.1), b) deviations between the market
prices and prices reported by oracles (Section 3.2), c) anom-
alies that may indicate oracle malfunctions or misbehaving
(Section 3.3), d) transaction graphs of oracles showing their
interactions with the ecosystem (Section 3.4).
3.1 Price Volatility
In this section, we demonstrate the price volatility of DeFi
assets that aim at removing volatility. We summarize daily
2The C-Ratio of Synthetix is 800% as for now.
Table 1: Price volatility of DeFi assets.
Assets Obs. Daily change±1% ±5% ±10% ±20%
DAI 69 47 (68%) 22 (32%) 0 0
SAI 764 502 (66%) 253 (33%) 8 (0.9%) 1 (0.1%)
AMPL 216 65 (30%) 92 (42%) 32 (15%) 27 (13%)
SNX 687 78 (11%) 272 (39%) 213 (31%) 124 (19%)
changes of the market prices (in USD, as reported by https://
coinmarketcap.com) for each discussed platform in Table 1,
where Obs. is the number of observations (i.e., days that a
platform is in operation). It can be observed that despite of
aiming a stability, all platforms experienced 1% or 5% price
changes within one single day. Moreover, in around 30% of
the investigated days, the market price of AMPL has more
than 10% daily price change. The price volatility over time is
depicted in Figure 6, where rapid prices changes are mainly
caused by changing volume, external events (like banning
cryptocurrencies by countries), or speculation. All the results
presented indicate that these DeFi protocols and protocols
relying on their assets require real-time accurate reference
price data to hedge the risk of high volatility.
3.2 Price Deviation
In this section, we measure the deviation between real-time
market prices and prices reported by the oracles of four ma-
jor DeFi platforms. We also investigate the possible reasons
for “outliers” – oracle reports with unusually higher devi-
ation than other reports. To conduct the study, we select
active oracles, with most frequent reporting, from Maker-
DAO, Compound, and Synthetix, reporting ETH/USD rates.
For AmpleForth, we investigate its official market oracle
which is supposed to report an AMPL/USD rate every 12
hours. We use Ethereum’s BigQuery database [22] to get
data about oracle interactions with their DeFi platforms. For
each oracle, we analyze its all transactions by extracting
their data and metadata, parsing the data to a readable price
format, and comparing it with the real-world price sources
that the oracle is supposed to be following (oracles may use
different price sources). In our experiments, we consider an
oracle’s claimed source as its baseline for the given asset
Figure 6: Historical prices of selected DeFi assets.
price. Moreover, as the methodologies of price reporting by
oracle are not strictly specified, for each baseline source, we
also show its real-time “raw” price and median values over
1, 5, 10, and 60 minutes.
Results.We first investigate the Synthetix oracle,3 by ana-
lyzing its 3,308 price posting and comparing them with the
data from different exchanges. As Synthetix is integrated
with Chainlink, we find that the oracle’s claimed ETH price
sources [13] are Coinmarketcap, Bitfinex [2] and Bittrex [3].
Therefore, in Figure 7 we show the ETH/USD price devia-
tions between the oracle reports and its price sources. As we
can see, the number of deviations is substantial with most
deviations standing within ±2% range.
Similarly, in Figure 8, we illustrate deviations of the Mak-
erDAO ETH/USD oracle4. As the oracle does not specify its
sources, we use the same baselines as in Synthetix for eval-
uation, except for Bittrex which provides the information
of ETH/USD rate only since June 2018 [18] (we measure the
oracle interactions starting from Jan 2018). As we can see,
there is a substantial number of deviations, with most of
them being within the 5% range, indicating that the Mak-
erDAO oracle is less effective than the previous Synthetix
oracle. Moreover, there are a few outlier reports, deviating
more than 10% (we investigate them further in Table 3).
In AmpleForth, the declared sources of oracle is Anylock-
analytics [17, 19], however, it does not provide a public API
to retrieve real-time prices for individuals. Therefore, we
consider the same baselines as in Synthetix, except for Bit-
trex which does not track AMPL/USD rates. We analyze 980
transactions for the AmpleForth oracle5 and check the results
against Coinmarketcap and Bitfinex. As shown in Figure 9,
the majority of deviations are within the 5% range, similarly
as for the Synthetix oracle. Interestingly, there is a single
outlier report with an extremely large deviation value (i.e.,
273.7%), which we discuss further in this section.
The oracle in Compound use Kraken [10] and Coinbase-
Pro [6] as its ETH/USD sources [5]. We conduct the evalua-
tion of the Compound oracle6, analyzing its 2,144 transac-
tions in total, and presenting the obtained results in Figure 10.
As we can see, most of the deviations are below the range of
4%, and there are only a few deviations above 5%.
Comparison. In Figure 11, we show the average deviation
of each source for all platforms. Please note, that the average
deviation is calculated asD =
∑N
n=1(|Dn |)/N , whereDn is the
percentage of each point (i.e., transaction) and N is the sum
of points (transactions). In most cases, the average deviation
is below 2%, which given the volatility of cryptoassets, can
3Address: 0xac1ed4fabbd5204e02950d68b6fc8c446ac95362
4Address: 0xfbaf3a7eb4ec2962bd1847687e56aaee855f5d00
5Address: 0x8844dfd05ac492d1924ad27ddd5e690b8e72d694
6Address: 0x3c6809319201b978d821190ba03fa19a3523bd96
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Figure 7: Price deviations of the Synthetix oracle from its price sources.
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Figure 8: Price deviations of the MakerDAO oracle
from its price sources.
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Figure 9: Price deviations of the AmpleForth oracle
from its price sources.
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Figure 10: Price deviations of the Compound oracle
from its price sources.
be seen as relatively precise information. From Figure 11a to
Figure 11c, we can see the average deviation increasing from
raw data to 60-minute median. In Synthetix, Bittrex is more
precise source compared to Coinmarketcap and Bitfinex. In
MakerDAO, Bitfinex is more accurate for the real-time price,
1-minute, and 5-minute median, while Coinmarketcap is
Table 2: Deviation comparison between different plat-
forms.
Oracle Obs. Source Rule # of dev. in range (%)
Avg d-
ev (%)≤1 ≤5 ≤10 >10
Synthextic
(ETH/USD) 3308
CMC1
raw 2388 969 1 0 0.808
1m 2245 1061 2 0 0.865
10m 2115 1183 10 0 0.955
1h 1733 1502 72 1 1.297
BF2
raw 3088 220 0 0 0.400
1m 3159 149 0 0 0.363
10m 2914 393 1 0 0.505
1h 2227 1046 35 0 0.945
Bittrex
raw 3048 260 0 0 0.386
1m 3121 186 1 0 0.339
10m 2925 381 2 0 0.485
1h 2276 997 35 0 0.927
MakerDAO
(ETH/USD) 4707
CMC
raw 2974 1708 22 3 0.952
1m 2733 1928 43 3 1.082
10m 2404 2226 73 4 1.292
1h 1799 2649 231 28 1.849
BF
raw 2903 1679 108 17 1.203
1m 2813 1791 93 10 1.174
10m 2813 1791 93 10 1.174
1h 1991 2472 224 20 1.720
Compound
(ETH/USD) 2144
CBP3
raw 1309 816 19 0 1.168
1m 1207 859 78 0 1.388
10m 1121 933 89 1 1.426
1h 871 1084 153 36 2.023
Kraken
raw 1059 1030 55 0 1.876
1m 1020 1055 69 0 2.152
10m 1001 992 151 0 2.302
1h 979 989 143 33 2.612
AmpleForth
(AMPL/USD) 980
CMC
raw 418 449 86 27 2.639
1m 411 458 84 27 2.629
10m 413 451 83 28 2.625
1h 448 423 83 26 2.513
BF
raw 387 455 112 26 2.792
1m 388 455 110 27 2.777
10m 397 444 112 27 2.770
1h 417 430 107 26 2.654
1 Coinmarketcap. 2 Bitfinex. 3 CoinbasePro.
better for the 10- and 60-minute median. For Compound, it
is observed that CoinbasePro is much more accurate than
Table 3: Outliers analysis.
Platform Tx hash Time Oracle
(/USD)
Baseline
(/USD)
Dev. (%) Possible explanations
AmpleForth 0x9c61.. 2020-03-05 00:31 6.23 1.66 273.7 Oracle wrong input (most likely)0x67fb.. 2020-03-13 00:39 0.855 0.569 50.2 Exchange price sudden drop
Compound 0x33ba.. 2020-02-17 16:02 271 256 5.85 Exchange price sudden drop0xde2f.. 2019-11-08 18:12 181 191 -5.9 Exchange price sudden increase
MakerDAO 0x698a.. 2020-03-13 02:44 121.49 107.73 12.8 Exchange price sudden drop0x38b0.. 2020-03-13 02:36 110.43 98.43 12.2 Exchange price sudden drop
Synthetix 0xd9f0.. 2020-03-19 16:29 138.66 131.78 5.2 Exchange price sudden drop0x3860.. 2020-03-15 00:30 127.82 122.19 4.6 US stock market volatility
Figure 11: Deviation comparison (per platform) among different sources.
Kraken. Furthermore, the results of the AmpleForth oracle
indicate an opposite trend to the other three platforms. That
is most likely caused by this oracle processing the price
averaged over a longer period of time before reporting to an
aggregator.
To illustrate the differences between the oracles better, we
also give the specific numbers in Table 2. We can observe that
the deviations of most posting behaviors are ≤1% and ≤5%
except for AmpleForth, where its oracle introduces relatively
higher deviation. A possible reason may be that the baselines
measured by us are different from used by them (as men-
tioned before, AmpleForth oracles do not reveal their price
sources). However, the average deviation in our measure-
ment is around 2.5%, which compared with other platforms
seems to be tolerable.
Outliers. As every oracle may face some inevitable outliers
due to sudden changes in real-time price or mistakes by
oracles itself, in Table 3 we present selected reports with
large deviation values observed in Section 3.1. In Ample-
Forth, the market oracle had one evident posting error on
5 March 20207, when the oracle submitted the price with
the hex format of 0x5667f2bb31e073c7 which introduced
273.7% deviation from the current exchange price. We have
not found any reason for this anomaly and we suspect an
7Transaction info: https://bit.ly/2KHiTFE
input error.8 Another interesting anomaly report had 50.2%
deviation.9, This inconsistent inputwasmost likely due to the
sudden drop of the exchange rate, hitting the lowest price in
the past four months. The similar situation happened to the
oracle of MakerDAO submitting two reports, deviating 12.8%
and 12.2% respectively, due to the sudden drop of cryptoas-
set exchange rates in the past three months10. In Synthetix
and Compound, the percentage of top two outlier reports is
much smaller than for the previous two platforms, with just
around 5%. The largest outlier in Synthetix also comes from
the sudden drops of real price11 while the second largest is
most likely due to the recent US stock market volatility.
3.3 Failures
In this section, we investigate oracle failures. For MakerDAO,
Compound and AmpleForth, we check all transactions which
were submitted by their oracles but which got processed by
the Ethereum network unsuccessfully (either rejected by
the network or reverted by the oracle itself). For Synthetix,
due to the integration with Chainlink, we inspect the oracle
nodes of all supported assets, find out the real sources they
collect from, and then measure those oracles.
8When changing the first digital number of the transaction payload, the
deviation lowers to 2.9%, which is a standard range for this oracle.
9Transaction info: https://bit.ly/2K5kSDF
10Transaction info: https://bit.ly/3ep74BO, https://bit.ly/2K3NcGb
11Transaction info: https://bit.ly/34Av0xo
Table 4: Oracle failures.
Platform Address Type Total Failures Remark
(/USD)
MakerDAO
0x000d.. ETH 7042 54 (0.77%) out of gas
0x005b.. ETH 7545 164 (2.17%) out of gas
0x0032.. ETH 11032 154 (1.39%) out of gas
0xa8eb.. ETH 12633 67 (0.53%) out of gas
AmpleForth 0xd035.. AMPL 953 30 (3.15%) reverted0xcaef.. AMPL 295 34 (11.53%) reverted
MakerDAO. The reference price ETH/USD in MakerDAO
is updated by an aggregator, which collates price data from a
number of external sources. As shown in Table 4, there are 54
failed transactions occurred in the total 7,042 due to out-of-
gas error12 in one ETH oracle13, with 0.77% failure rate. The
similar issues can be found for the another three oracles14
with 2.17%, 1.39% and 0.53% failure rates, respectively.
AmpleForth. Next, we investigate all transactions origi-
nated from AmpleForth’s oracles. In Table 4, we show our
findings that 3015 and 3416 reverted transactions happened
in two market oracles of AmpleForth by April 2020.
Synthetix. Synthetix is fully integrated with Chainlink for
feed services. Each asset type supported in Synthetix has
a collection of corresponding Chainlink’s nodes to com-
plete oracle-like jobs. We further review the nodes for all
exchange pairs – ETH/USD, BTC/USD, AUD/USD, EUR/USD,
CHF/USD, GBP/USD, JPY/USD, XAG/USD and XUG/USD, to
find out potential failures.
In Table 5, we give the details on oracles, their respec-
tive sources, and the issues encountered. We found that
Omniscience, Ztake.org, Anyblock, and Simply VC submit-
ted transactions which subsequently have been reverted by
the Ethereum network. By 14 February 2020, Alpha Van-
tage received 17 requests from Chainlink but ignored them,
submitting no successful responses. LinkPool employs two
external sources, i.e., CryptoCompare and Alpha Vantage,
for ETH, BTC, AUD, and XAG rates. However, Alpha Van-
tage is unreliable which renders LinkPool to be unreliable
too. Fiews, Cosmostation, Validation, etc,. are stable nodes
with no anomalies found, while the sources of stake.fish
and Chainlayer are unknown to the public, thus cannot be
publicly audited.
12This error happens when a transaction to be completed requires more
computing resources than provided by its sender.
13Address: 0x000df128eb60a88913f6135a2b83143c452c494e
14Addresses: 0x005b903dadfd96229cba5eb0e5aa75c578e8f968,
0x0032ad8fae086f87ff54699954650354bb51e050,
0xa8eb82456ed9bae55841529888cde9152468635a
15Address: 0xd0352aad6763f12d0a529d9590ea2f30421667a6
16Address: 0xcaefaf2130f0751520d5a6a62f3b9c9eaa4739f4
Table 5: The price oracles of Synthetix.
Oracle Price (/USD) Issues
Omniscience ETH, GBP, XAU Reverted transaction(s)
Anyblock BTC Reverted transaction(s)
Ztake.org AUD, BTC, XAG Reverted transaction(s)
Simply VC BTC, EUR, CHF,
GBP, XAG
Reverted transaction(s)
Alpha AUD, EUR, CHF,
GBP, JPY
17 requests from ChainLink but 0
successfull responses
LinkPool ETH, BTC, AUD,
XAG
Two sources: CryptoCompare and
Alpha Vantage.
stake.fish ETH, AUD, JPY Oracles are unknown to the public
Chainlayer ETH, AUD, JPY Oracles are unknown to the public
Fiews EUR, CHF, JPY,
XAG
N.A.
Cosmostation ETH N.A.
Validation ETH, CHF N.A.
SDL BTC, EUR N.A.
LinkFprest CHF N.A.
3.4 Transaction Activity Analysis
An oracle addressmay interact with a large number of Ethereum
addresses that could be an ERC-20 token contract, an on-
chain service, an entity from other protocol or an external
account address, etc. In this section, we focus on the trans-
action activities analysis for oracles of the DeFi platforms.
We crawl the entire transaction history of oracles by using
BigQuery, then we build transaction graphs, and find what
are most common addresses oracles interact with, what enti-
ties or external accounts they communicate with, and what
interesting activities they are involved in.
AmpleForth.We collect 132,119 transactions from the mar-
ket oracle of AmpleForth, and find out that there are 47
different addresses interacting with the oracle. As depicted
in Figure 12a, the large proportion of entire transactions are
interactions with Chainlink’s aggregators, colored in green.
The red node indicates that the market oracle has 161 trans-
actions with UpgradeProxy contract of AmpleForth to set or
update certain parameters. The blue and orange ones are ex-
ternal account addresses with 48 and 1 transaction involved.
The oracle sent 48 transaction without input data to the blue
node17 in succession on 13 March 2020 (most likely, these
are testing activities).
MakerDAO. Similarly, we use the ETH/USD MakerDAO
oracle as our measurement target, extract 4,914 transactions,
17Address: 0x43eb83a6b54a98b2d051c933b8e4a900d6bacbee
Table 6: Comparison of the oracle designs.
Platform Freq. Design Hierarchy
(/hour)
MakerDAO 1, 6 Centralized aggregator Centralized
Compound 2, 5 Centralized aggregator Centralized
AmpleForth 12 Aggregator + Chainlink Semi-decentralized
Synthetix 1/12 Chainlink nodes Decentralized
analyze them, and present results in Figure 12b. As depicted,
the oracle interacts with four types of entities from seven
different addresses. Most transactions are about price posting
behaviors, however, there are two failed one due to out-of-
gas error. It has four proxy activities (red nodes) and only
three token transfers (blue nodes) of SAI and DAI. Moreover,
there is one migration activity when the platform decided to
make SAI and DAI conversion.
Compound. We select an ETH/USD oracle in Compound
and analyze its all 11,458 transactions. All transactions are
about the price reporting actions interacted with three on-
chain aggregators in total. In contrast to the oracles of other
platforms, the transaction history does not contain interac-
tions with other actors or services.
Synthetix. The 142,422 transaction graph of the Synthetix
oracle is depicted in Figure 12d. Similar to other platforms,
this ETH/USD oracle mainly interacts with the active aggre-
gator contracts marked in green color. An exception is one
of the aggregators (orange node)18 which is self-destructed
without a clear reason. Besides that, the oracle is also in-
volved in 2,056 transactions with the Synthetix network con-
tract, most are about getting the value of parameters from
the platform. One interesting activity (in red) is 667 trans-
actions sent in total to itself without input data (most likely
for testing purposes).
4 DISCUSSION
4.1 Decentralization
In the background section, we discuss different designs of
DeFi oracles. Some of them rely on centralized aggregators
to retrieve reference price while others develop the part-
nership with Chainlink’s feed providers. In this section, we
investigate how oracles systems are implemented in practice
and how that can influence the aimed decentralization of the
platforms.
Table 6 describes the selected properties of oracles that
influence their decentralization. MakerDAO and Compound
have similar architectures – they employ one single aggrega-
tor to periodically retrieve price information from external
whitelisted oracle nodes. This design introduces inherent
18Address: 0x5c545ca7f9d34857664fdce6adc22edcf1d5061f
centralization drawbacks even though other components of
these systems are deployed on decentralized smart contract
platforms. AmpleForth employs Chainlink to provide oracle
functionalities, which also mitigates (due to the design of
Chainlink) the centralized risks of a single aggregator. How-
ever, it still relies on an aggregator contract to collect data
from four oracles. In a near future, AmpleForth is planned to
be fully integrating with Chainlink for data feeds, thus, we
classify it as a semi-decentralized design as of now. Synthetix
has announced that Synthetix-Chainlink integration is now
operational on Ethereum [25], providing fully decentralized
price feeds. The data feed will be offloaded to the decentral-
ized oracle network of Chainlink and the reference price
rates are transferred on-chain by a number of independent
nodes backed by economic incentives rather than any cen-
tral parties. Therefore, as for now, its design is the closest to
being decentralized.
4.2 Recommendations
Our study, which can be seen as initial, indicates that the
oracle ecosystem is immature. Therefore, in this section, we
try to learn from our observations and give insights on the
potential improvements of future oracle platforms.
Transparency. As discussed in Section 3.2, the methodolo-
gies of price processing by oracles are not clearly stated.
Even the sources that the oracle retrieves from are ambigu-
ous or unknown to the platform users. This results in a lack
of transparency and potentially undetectable misbehavior
of oracle platforms as currently no entity is able to provably
examine the precision of price reported by oracles. Our first
recommendation for future oracle designs is to require or-
acles to explicitly declare their manifest. Such a manifest
would contain oracle metadata (like oracle contact informa-
tion), deployed data sources, intended frequency of oracle
updates, and precise description of the price derivation. Due
to its properties, we see the underlying blockchain platform
as a natural place of publishing such manifests.
Accountability.We believe that oracles, becoming critical
trusted parties, should be held accountable for their actions.
In the blockchain ecosystem, we can envision that a feasi-
ble way of implementing accountability is crypto-incentives.
Therefore, to incentivize oracles to report accurate prices
in promised frequency, we can imagine that the platforms
implement mechanisms that would punish an oracle violat-
ing its manifest or platform policies, e.g., events like late or
missing reports, or provable misbehavior like a high price
deviation. Such a mechanism could be partially implemented
by a smart contract, but it would require oracles to deposit
some substantial amount of cryptoassets.
Operational Robustness. We found it surprising that de-
spite relatively simple oracle interactions, they are not free
AmpleForth
Oracle
(a) AmpleForth
MakerDAO
Oracle
(b) MakerDAO
Compound
Oracle
(c) Compound
Synthetix
Oracle
(d) Synthetix
Figure 12: Transaction graphs of the DeFi oracles
from basic operational issues (e.g., causing out-of-gas errors).
Since oracle reports play a crucial role in the DeFi ecosystem,
we encourage operators to overprovision them by increasing
their gas and gas price. The former has to guarantee that
there is enough gas to be consumed by the entire execution
of the transaction. The latter parameter is important for the
latency of reports, which may be especially important when
the Ethereum network is congested [21]. A high gas price
would allow oracle reports to be appended to the blockchain
much faster, since the blockchain network prioritizes more
expensive transactions to be added first.
5 RELATEDWORK
We are not aware of any work measuring or analyzing DeFi
oracles, however, below we discuss work on the most related
topics.
Oracle Designs. Town Crier (TC) [37] is an authenticated
data feed system for smart contracts. The entity TC acts as a
bridge between smart contracts and existing web sites, which
are already commonly trusted for non-blockchain applica-
tions. It combines a blockchain front end with trusted hard-
ware (i.e., the Intel SGX technology [27]) back end to scrape
HTTPS-enabled websites and serve source-authenticated
data to relying upon smart contracts. Due to the integration
of the SGX enclave, it is possible in TC to conduct a remote
attestation that the correct code was executed. TC establishes
a secure TLS connection with a website and parses its con-
tent, which then can be used as an input to smart contracts.
However, one potential limitation of TC is it positions Intel
as a trusted party required to execute a remote attestation.
TLS-N [35] is a general TLS extension that provides secure
non-repudiation to the TLS protocol. TLS-Nmodifies the TLS
stack such that TLS records sent by a server are authenticated
(in batches). Therefore, TLS-N clients can present received
TLS-N records to the third parties which can verify it, just
trusting the server (without any other third trusted parties).
In general, TLS-N generates non-interactive proofs about
the content of a TLS session that can be efficiently verified
by third parties and blockchain-based smart contracts. As
such, TLS-N increases the accountability for the content pro-
vided on the web and enables a practical and decentralized
blockchain oracle for web content. However, the main draw-
back is its deployability. It requires significant changes to
the TLS protocol and adoption processes are pretty slow.
Practical Data Feed Service (PDFS) [29] is a system that
extends content providers by including new features for data
transparency and consistency validations. It allows content
providers to link their web entities with their blockchain enti-
ties. In PDFS, data is authenticated over blockchain but with-
out breaking TLS trust chains or modifying TLS stacks. More-
over, content providers can specify data formats they would
like to use freely, thus data can be easily parsed and cus-
tomized for smart contracts. PDFS keeps content providers
auditable and mitigates their malicious activities (e.g., data
modification or censorship) and allows them to create a
new business model. The shortcoming is the validation logic
placed in smart contracts is not too lightweight or efficient
and the design with shorter proofs could be a potential im-
provement for PDFS.
DeFi Surveys. [26] provides an understandable survey of
on mainstream DeFi protocols, mainly focus on designs of
stablecoins. [32] and [33] systematically discuss the general
designs of existing DeFi platforms. By decomposing the de-
signs into various components, i.e., peg assets, collateral
amount, price information and governance mechanism, such
surveys aim to explore the strengths and drawbacks of DeFi
platforms to identify future directions.
Attacking DeFi. [34] presents a detailed exploration of the
flash loan mechanism on the Ethereum network for the DeFi
ecosystem. It analyzes two existing attacks vectors with ROIs
beyond 500k%, then formulates finding flash loan-based at-
tack parameters as an optimization problem. It also shows
how two previously executed attacks can be “boosted” to
result in a profit of 829.5k USD and 1.1M USD, respectively,
which is a boost of 2.37× and 1.73×, respectively. Lewis et
al. [30] explore how the weaknesses of design could lead to
DeFi crisis. In their paper, over-collateralization and gover-
nance attack onMakerDAO are discussed and a new financial
contagion is proposed.
For the pump-and-dump scheme in cryptocurrency prob-
lem, [36] investigates 412 pump-and-dump activities and
discovers patterns in crypto-markets associated with pump-
and-dump schemes by building a model that predicts the
pump likelihood of all assets listed in a crypto-exchange
prior to a pump. Josh et al. [31] examines existing informa-
tion on pump-and-dump schemes from classical economic
literature, synthesizes this with cryptocurrencies, and pro-
poses criteria that can be used to define a cryptocurrency
pump-and-dump. The patterns can exhibit anomalous behav-
ior, are utilized to locate points of anomalous trading activity
in order to flag potential pump-and-dump activity.
Philip et al.[28] present the arbitrage strategies on de-
centralized exchanges that are executed by bots who pay
high transaction fees and optimize their network latency to
front-run ordinary users’ trades. By empirically studying
the bot’s profit-making and blockchain-specific strategies,
[28] formally models the behavior of the bots competing
against each other for miner-supplied transaction priority in
priority gas auction, demonstrating that in many cases, the
revenue of bots from pure revenue arbitrage far exceeds the
Ethereum block reward and transaction fees.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present the first study of DeFi oracles. We
first dispel the mist of oracle designs of mainstreamDeFi plat-
forms. By conducting large-scale measurements of deployed
oracles for four prominent open DeFi platforms – Maker-
DAO, Compound, AmpleForth and Synthetix, we investigate
the details of price deviation that comes from the differences
between the price information provided by real-time price
and oracle nodes. We compare the price deviations of the de-
ployed platforms, conduct the detailed measurement on the
stability, accountability, and deployment patterns of oracles.
We find that deviations from the claimed sources as well as
operational failures are quite frequent. Finally, we give the
discussion on the potential security vulnerabilities that such
platforms may suffer from and give recommendations that
could improve some of the found drawbacks.
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